Transitioning to PQC is considerably more complex than fixing the Y2K bug
If you remember the Y2K challenge, you’ll recall it was mostly about a narrow date code fix. It was precise, scoped, and, looking back, relatively straightforward. Now take that, and imagine doing it for every layer of your infrastructure, data security, and software systems. That’s what we’re dealing with in transitioning to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). It’s a full structural evolution.
Over the last three decades, encryption has become deeply embedded in almost everything, logins, transactions, inter-service communication, operational tech. As Ollie Whitehouse, CTO of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), says: making this transition is a “colossal task” demanding a “complex change programme.” He’s right. Modern organizations are running thousands, sometimes millions, of cryptographic functions across cloud, edge, embedded, and legacy systems. Before you can fix or future-proof anything, you have to identify every instance that relies on encryption. That alone is a huge job.
The problem is compounded by dependencies, legacy systems that weren’t built to be updated, and the organizational inertia that naturally comes with complex enterprises. You can’t fake readiness here. PQC migration is a strategy-level decision. It will require sustained operational planning, strong funding models, and leadership from the top. This transition is global, multi-year, and unlike past challenges, it’s not waiting for a deadline to explode, it’s creeping up via the exponential pace of quantum computing progress.
Quantum computing presents a threat to current encryption standards
Let’s be clear: conventional encryption is running out of time. Most of what we rely on today, whether securing banking apps, enterprise APIs, or national communications, will be breakable by quantum computers. We’re not talking about theoretical threats anymore. Major players in quantum computing are making relevant progress, and conservative estimates put compromise-capable machines in-market as early as the 2030s.
What does this mean? A quantum computer with enough qubits and low enough noise could break public-key encryption like RSA or ECC. These algorithms secure nearly all digital trust processes, anything from SSL connections to encrypted emails and document signatures. We built the internet on top of these standards. Break them, and authentication fails. Confidentiality disappears. Compliance collapses.
Now here’s the real challenge: there’s a window opening for malicious actors to harvest encrypted data today and simply wait until decryption gets easier. State-level adversaries are already doing this, collecting and storing encrypted communications now with the plan to decrypt them later. That means even if you think your systems are secure now, that’s only true based on current computational models. With quantum, that certainty is gone.
This isn’t alarmist. It’s trajectory-based forecasting. If you’re in a boardroom today, and your roadmap doesn’t already account for post-quantum threats, you’re behind. The decisions you make over the next five years will determine whether your infrastructure stays secure for the next 50.
A structured national plan is guiding the UK’s migration to PQC by 2035
The UK isn’t sitting still on this. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), part of GCHQ, has laid out a clear, multi-phase timeline for the country’s transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The objective is not mass panic. It’s deliberate migration. Here’s what that looks like: by 2028, organizations need to identify their dependent cryptographic systems and finalize a migration plan. From 2028 to 2031, they handle high-priority upgrades. By 2035, the aim is full PQC deployment across all major cryptographic infrastructure.
That timeline tells you two things. First, the threat is real, and second, leaders are treating this with the seriousness it deserves. Executives running critical services need to recognize that this isn’t a future issue, it’s a current responsibility. Systems already being architected today may need a structural cryptographic overhaul in under a decade. If you deploy new infrastructure without accounting for quantum resilience, you’re building tech debt into your roadmap.
The phased approach is smart. It allows for planning, budgeting, and organizational preparation. But make no mistake, the action must happen early. You don’t want to hit 2030 still mapping your dependencies. Having a clear migration policy in place in the next few years will define how resilient your business is across supply chains, data flows, and compliance frames.
Sectors possessing critical infrastructure and sensitive data face unique pressures in the PQC transition
Not all organizations face the same level of pressure with PQC. Small and medium-sized enterprises can offload much of their cryptographic transition to managed service providers. That option doesn’t exist for critical infrastructure players, government bodies, or multinational corporations. If you’re running essential services, financial systems, or defense-aligned technologies, the responsibility for your PQC transition falls on internal leadership.
These sectors typically have labyrinthine architectures, legacy systems, siloed security frameworks, and strict compliance obligations. Upgrading cryptographic components, especially at scale, takes more than funding, it demands strong governance and technical oversight. The margin for error is thinner, and the risk implications are broader. The NCSC is facilitating consultancy and guidance programs to help organizations navigate this, but the ownership still lies with enterprise leadership.
If you lead in one of these sectors, you’re not just protecting infrastructure, you’re protecting trust. Slow movement here affects national resilience. Board-level attention is non-negotiable. That means funding teams to inventory crypto dependencies, investing in cross-domain coordination between security and ops, and resisting quick vendor-led fixes that promise PQC compatibility without long-term validation.
Transitioning critical sectors will be complex, but it’s not optional. It’s responsibility at scale. Getting this wrong risks more than system downtime, it’s reputational, operational, and strategic impact in an era where trust is as important as performance.
The NCSC is actively preventing premature or inappropriate PQC implementations by vendors
Rushing into post-quantum cryptography (PQC) without fully vetted solutions is a problem. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) understands this. It’s why they’ve issued guidelines, to stop suppliers from pushing untested or immature PQC products onto organizations, especially those responsible for critical infrastructure. These technologies need to scale securely and reliably. Rolling them out too early introduces unnecessary risks.
If you’re managing procurement, this guidance should act as a filter. Not every PQC-labeled product is fit for deployment. Pressure from vendors, driven more by market competition than technical readiness, can force poor decision-making. The NCSC’s position is practical: adopt when the tech is mature, when it’s backed by standards, and when you’ve completed a proper review of your cryptographic asset landscape.
Boards and executive teams need to evaluate new PQC options not just through price and urgency, but through security assurance and lifecycle durability. Implementation without context, without considering system compatibility, performance trade-offs, or future extensibility, can introduce new attack surfaces rather than close them. The market will keep moving fast. Your responsibility is to move deliberately, based on clear criteria and trusted frameworks.
NCSC’s guidance also gives CISOs and security architects the ammunition they need to push back internally, especially when facing pressure to adopt too early. Actual resilience requires preparation, not speed.
Rapid advancements in AI are reducing the window for patching vulnerabilities, further complicating PQC migration
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing the cyber threat landscape in ways that directly impact PQC transition. Threat actors are increasingly using AI to identify, exploit, and scale attacks against known vulnerabilities faster than organizations can respond. What used to take days or weeks to detect and exploit can now happen in hours. That compresses the time organizations have to patch weaknesses, especially in older encrypted systems that were never designed for that kind of response velocity.
Now combine that dynamic with PQC migration. Most enterprises are already working through complex legacy environments. Accelerated AI attack cycles add urgency to replacing algorithms that are not quantum-resilient. If you’re still using outdated cryptographic libraries, they need to be redesigned for automation-aware threats.
For executives, this is operational exposure. Any lag in your ability to identify and update legacy systems increases the chance of compromise. Organizations need to adapt in two ways: reduce time-to-patch across their infrastructure and integrate post-quantum readiness into every transformation process. The goal is to prevent one vulnerability from creating cascade failures across your digital operations.
Attack surfaces are growing, and AI gives threat actors a speed advantage. Your job is to neutralize that with structural readiness, shorter patch cycles, smarter threat monitoring, and forward-compatible cryptographic infrastructure. Managing this in parallel with PQC rollout is not optional. It’s what defines whether your security strategy is reactive or future-proof.
Long-term resilience hinges on reducing technical debt and embedding security into product design
If you want to future-proof your infrastructure, you can’t ignore technical debt. These are the shortcuts taken in past software development, frameworks rushed to market, patches applied without proper architecture review, and systems left outdated. That debt restricts your ability to move fast when real threats hit, especially during high-impact transitions like post-quantum cryptography (PQC).
Ollie Whitehouse, CTO of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), put it directly: without radical and sustained action, the industry risks repeating the same security failures that have haunted it for the last thirty years, but now with deeper consequences. That’s not speculation. That’s based on historical trends and current operating environments.
Security needs to be part of the product design process from the beginning. For executives, this means investing in secure-by-design frameworks, rewarding development discipline, and directing architectural efforts toward long-term stability. PQC migration isn’t just about applying new cryptography, it’s about rebuilding trust in the systems that handle the most sensitive operations, at scale.
This requires leadership. Not just from IT, but from the boardroom. Because technical debt is not just a tech team problem, it’s a strategic liability. If your company is maintaining systems that can’t evolve fast enough, you are limiting your ability to respond to threats that move faster every year. PQC readiness is an opportunity to modernize. Take it. Clean up outdated architecture and demand durable, secure systems moving forward.
Resilience comes from deliberate action. You can’t patch foundational weaknesses with short-term solutions. You have to fix the foundation. If you lead that effort now, your systems won’t just survive PQC, they’ll be stronger because of it.
Recap
This isn’t just about encryption. It’s about leadership, long-term decisions, and whether your organization is positioned to adapt before the technical landscape shifts under your feet. Quantum computing isn’t science fiction anymore. It’s an engineering certainty on an uncertain timeline. Waiting for full-scale disruption to act isn’t a strategy, it’s a risk exposure.
You don’t need to panic. You do need a plan. That starts with identifying what cryptographic systems you rely on, understanding where the vulnerabilities sit, and building a timeline for migration that fits both your infrastructure and risk profile.
The biggest mistake executives can make now is delegating this entirely to technical teams without oversight. The migration to post-quantum cryptography will touch every part of your organization, from customer data and financial systems to product architecture and regulatory compliance.
This is operational resilience at the security layer. You get this right, your business stays trusted and competitive as threats evolve. Ignore it, and every forward-facing asset becomes a liability.
