The UK must implement a robust digital sovereignty strategy
Right now, too much of the UK’s digital backbone is controlled by foreign tech giants. US-based infrastructure providers are deeply embedded in British systems, everything from cloud services to defense platforms. Technically, these systems work fine. Strategically? Not so much.
The Open Rights Group has a clear message: relying on foreign-controlled systems introduces vulnerabilities no mature digital economy should ignore. If service providers are compelled to follow legal or political mandates from their home country, that could place UK data, and its autonomy, at risk. A digital sovereignty strategy would set clear guidelines that reduce these points of failure. It would force evaluations around three simple questions: Can the system survive if a vendor pulls out? Can local laws keep foreign powers out of British data? Do we have local replacements ready when geopolitics shift?
We’re talking about resilience here, and not just in the IT sense. It’s long-term structural control over strategic infrastructure. The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is a legitimate legislative chance to build this authority while there’s still room to maneuver. Waiting for a crisis to expose the issue isn’t leadership, it’s cleanup.
James Baker, platform power program manager at the Open Rights Group, summed it up well: relying on US providers for essential infrastructure is “risky and irresponsible.” He’s right. You don’t want mission-critical systems tied to another country’s political will. UK policymakers have an opportunity. They need to take it.
US control over hyperscale cloud services creates specific legal and strategic risks for UK data security
The UK runs a lot of its public sector and commercial workloads on clouds operated by Microsoft Azure and Amazon Web Services. These are hyperscale platforms, powerful, scalable, and globally distributed. But that scale carries a problem: control. Because these are American companies, they’re obligated to follow US laws. That includes laws like the CLOUD Act, letting US authorities demand access to data, even if the data is stored outside their borders.
That means UK-regulated content hosted on AWS or Microsoft servers can be accessed without following UK legal channels. That’s not just a loophole, it’s a shadow jurisdiction.
From a business standpoint, this complicates trust. Companies putting sensitive data on these platforms need to answer hard questions from clients, partners, even regulators: Who legally owns the data in the cloud? What happens if there’s a conflict between jurisdictions? And what guarantees do you have?
Microsoft admitted in testimony to the French Senate in June 2025 that it cannot guarantee the complete sovereignty of EU data stored in its services. That’s not small. On top of that, reporting by Computer Weekly revealed that Microsoft’s cloud architecture enables UK public sector data to be moved and processed in more than 100 countries. That’s global reach, but also global risk.
This creates exposure not just around privacy, but around operational continuity. Leaders need to take this seriously. Dependencies on cloud platforms should be continually assessed, and governments need to draw clearer lines on how British data is secured by British law. The technology is sound. The governance isn’t.
Government procurement practices are reinforcing dependency on US tech firms, sidelining domestic alternatives
UK government procurement decisions continue to favor dominant US technology providers. Recently, the Ministry of Defence signed a £240 million contract with Palantir, awarded without competition. This is the largest defense data analytics deal in UK history. The contract gives Palantir control over decision-support systems across strategic, tactical, and live operational contexts. No British or European firms even had a chance to bid.
This isn’t just about a single contract. It’s a pattern. Even as the UK publicly promotes a vision of becoming an AI powerhouse, the public sector continues to pour billions into foreign platforms. Domestic startups, established British software vendors, and EU-based providers offering competitive and secure solutions are consistently overlooked.
Liberal Democrat peer Tim Clement-Jones has made the issue clear. The Sovereign AI Unit within the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), which was meant to drive UK’s self-reliant AI capacity, seems to have “zero influence” on procurement. Vendors like Palantir, Microsoft, and AWS dominate the contract pipeline while British firms remain under-leveraged or excluded.
This procurement behavior isn’t sustainable. It locks in foreign vendor dependency, undermines the UK’s capacity to foster its own tech ecosystem, and stalls innovation. If you want to build sovereign digital infrastructure, control has to start with control over procurement. Leadership here should be active, not reactive.
Prioritizing open source and interoperable systems is key to enhancing the UK’s digital autonomy
If the UK wants to strengthen its digital autonomy, it needs to rethink the fundamental structure of its systems. Open source platforms and interoperable architectures deserve top priority. This isn’t idealism, it’s strategic groundwork.
Open systems reduce friction in supplier transitions. They let British firms bid competitively and maintain core public sector systems without long, expensive onboarding cycles. Interoperability also removes barriers that lock you into a single vendor’s ecosystem, which adds cost, limits agility, and introduces unnecessary risk.
The Open Rights Group emphasizes that closed, proprietary tools are creating digital fragility. Dependencies form rapidly. Over time, they become barriers to exit that governments and enterprises struggle to undo, especially during critical events or political disputes.
By contrast, embracing open source solutions increases resilience. These systems can be self-hosted, audited, and forked. You gain operational transparency, direct oversight, and scalability without asking for permission from a foreign supplier. More importantly, procurement opportunities open up for UK-based developers, creating a stronger internal market while decreasing reliance on dominant external players.
From the C-suite perspective, this is about leverage. Strategic agility starts with infrastructure you actually control. Choosing open and interoperable systems now gives you more options later. That’s a rational, forward-looking policy any executive should stand behind.
International incidents underscore how digital infrastructures can be leveraged as geopolitical tools
Digital infrastructure isn’t neutral. Who controls the platform often dictates how it’s used, and under what pressures it operates. Recent global events show how even commercial technologies can quickly become extensions of geopolitical agendas.
Take Microsoft, for example. In 2025, the company disconnected the Outlook account of Karim Khan, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), following U.S. sanctions imposed over the ICC’s legal actions involving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Microsoft insists it maintained contact with the ICC throughout the event. Still, it was disruptive enough that the institution dropped Microsoft services entirely that October, switching to OpenDesk, an open source European platform. That move wasn’t about convenience. It was about control.
Then there’s John Deere. After Russian forces reportedly stole agricultural equipment during the Ukraine conflict, the company remotely disabled the machinery. While that decision may seem justified, it demonstrates how easily connected hardware can be turned off from a distance by a private company under external influence. If political pressure mounts, similar actions could be directed against civilian, commercial, or even government-controlled equipment elsewhere.
These aren’t theoretical risks; they’re operational precedents.
The Open Rights Group cites these cases to highlight a core problem: without sovereignty over your platforms, you’re constantly exposed. Whether it’s cloud services, enterprise software, or physical infrastructure, foreign vendors can act on instructions that have nothing to do with your country’s laws or interests.
C-suite leaders should stop viewing digital systems as isolated tools and start treating them as strategic assets. If your infrastructure can be altered, interrupted, or shut down, remotely or by outside influence, you don’t own it. Rectifying that has to be a top priority. Sovereign infrastructure isn’t about protectionism; it’s about securing functionality under all conditions. That clarity needs to be built now.
Key takeaways for leaders
- Strengthen national control over digital infrastructure: UK leaders should embed digital sovereignty requirements into legislation to reduce over-reliance on foreign-controlled tech systems and ensure strategic autonomy.
- Limit jurisdictional exposure in cloud services: Decision-makers must assess legal risks tied to hosting sensitive data on US-owned hyperscale cloud platforms, and consider alternatives that comply strictly with UK law.
- Reform procurement to support domestic innovation: Executives in government procurement should prioritize competitive bidding and evaluate UK-based vendors to reduce lock-in with dominant US firms and foster local capability.
- Invest in open source and interoperability: Leaders should drive adoption of open and interoperable platforms to improve resilience, reduce switching costs, and enable fair access for domestic tech providers.
- Recognize infrastructure as a geopolitical asset: Strategic systems can be disrupted or influenced by foreign state interests; executives should proactively assess risk exposure and ensure sovereignty over digital assets.
