Canadian ICS vulnerability to cyberattacks
Canada’s industrial control systems are becoming easy targets for cyber threats. That’s a national-level alert. These systems are the foundation of core services like clean water, stable energy flow, and food production. Unlike today’s highly networked platforms, ICS systems were never designed to be exposed to the public internet. They lack modern defenses, and that’s a serious concern.
These systems, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs), and SCADA platforms, were built to optimize operations, not to dodge hackers. Add weak passwords, poor segmentation between operations and IT networks, and what you’ve got is a blueprint for intrusion. Exposing public infrastructure to the internet without upgrading security is like leaving the front door unlocked.
Many organizations don’t even know what ICS assets are connected to the internet, let alone secure them. The attack surface grows with every connection made. The Canadian government has confirmed threat actors are capitalizing on this gap, and that most incidents show patterns of preventable access, default passwords, publicly exposed ports, and outdated software.
For executives, this isn’t a deeply technical issue. It’s structural. If your business relies on critical infrastructure, be aware that these risks are real. Investing in visibility, knowing what assets are online, securing access, and isolating environments, isn’t optional. It’s foundational. Because once an attacker’s in, your brand, operations, and credibility are on the line.
Real-world disruptions from targeted attacks
These attacks have already happened. In one case in Canada, a municipal water facility was hit. Hackers gained access and changed water pressure through internet-connected control systems. That’s not a glitch report. That’s people in a community losing a basic service, if only briefly.
Here’s another. A large oil and gas company saw its remote tank monitoring system tampered with, prompting a cascade of false alarms. That doesn’t just waste time. It drains resources, postpones actual response to real issues, and erodes trust in automated systems. Meanwhile, a separate attack on an agricultural silo changed internal temperature and humidity levels, two critical metrics for storing grain. That kind of tampering could compromise entire harvests.
These are low-complexity, high-impact attacks. The systems weren’t deeply protected, and bad actors exploited that. We’re not talking about advanced persistent threats or nation-state espionage here. We’re talking about misuse of exposed systems that should have never been online without protection.
For C-suite leaders, understand this: these aren’t just technical malfunctions, they are operational sabotage events. And they’re happening with increasing frequency. When industrial systems fail because someone changed a value remotely, it doesn’t just hurt operations. It makes your board ask hard questions. Questions you should be ready to answer before the disruption, not after.
The impact of direct internet exposure and weak segmentation
If there’s one thing that continues to show up in every successful ICS breach, it’s unrestricted internet exposure. Systems are accessible directly from the web, connecting critical infrastructure to an environment that was never meant to be trusted. That shouldn’t still be happening in 2024, but it is.
These industrial networks often lack basic controls, no segmentation between IT and OT, no two-factor authentication, and in many cases, they’re still using default usernames and passwords. Once someone gains access, they can start interacting with the environment in real time. That includes changing sensor outputs, forcing process alarms, or altering operational settings. And they don’t need advanced toolkits to do it.
What this really tells us is that many environments haven’t set security as a core design principle. They’re still functioning on architectures optimized for performance, not protection. The logic is outdated. And it’s costing us stability.
As a leader, take this seriously. Network segmentation isn’t just a technical configuration, it’s a strategic barrier. When you don’t separate your operational and corporate digital environments, any compromised vendor laptop or exposed cloud asset can become an entry point into your core process environment. That’s not a risk most organizations are prepared to absorb. It’s worth the architecture rethink.
Predominance of hacktivist groups as the threat actors
These aren’t state-sponsored attacks designed to spy quietly for long-term economic advantage. What we’re seeing in Canada right now points to hacktivist groups, actors focused on disruption and attention. The goal isn’t stealth. It’s visibility. They breach, manipulate some part of a control process, then push the event into the media cycle. It’s about narrative, not nation-state strategy.
That’s a key shift decision-makers can’t ignore. The motivation is different, and that changes the threat posture entirely. These groups don’t care about avoiding detection over time. Their attacks are loud, fast, and timed for public exposure. That makes them harder to predict, but easier to frustrate if you’re prepared.
Importantly, even though these attacks are shorter and more chaotic than traditional espionage campaigns, they still carry wide-ranging consequences. Most ICS systems link to larger corporate or regional infrastructure networks. A small intervention in one node can ripple across systems, triggering business downtime, regulatory reporting, or broader operational disruptions.
For executives, this means reframing ICS security not just as a technical risk but as a reputational and continuity issue. Hacktivist attacks are built for visibility. If your brand depends on uninterrupted service, these threats aren’t hypothetical. They’re already aiming at visibility, and your organization is a potential stage.
Essential cybersecurity practices to protect ICS
Let’s keep it simple, strong fundamentals still work. The organizations that avoid damaging ICS intrusions aren’t relying on secret tools. They’re executing core practices consistently across environments. That includes mapping internet-facing assets, cutting unnecessary connections, enforcing strict access policies, and isolating operational networks from everything else.
A zero-trust model is no longer optional. It means limiting access, verifying every connection, and rejecting default trust assumptions across users and devices. That applies equally to engineers, SREs, vendors, and automated systems. Remote access should be controlled end-to-end, using VPNs, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and IP whitelisting. Anything less invites unnecessary exposure.
Detection also needs to evolve. Deploy modern tools that recognize unusual behavior across endpoints and network traffic. You can’t prevent everything, but you can see signs early and respond quickly. That means intrusion prevention systems (IPS), endpoint detection and response (EDR), and automated alert frameworks with low false positive rates.
And don’t forget the boring stuff, stay current on patches. Systems need regular security audits and tests. Incident response plans should be active exercises, not shelf documents. Not because that makes you compliant, but because it limits chaos when something breaks unexpectedly.
From the top, executives should drive this as a priority. Resilience starts at the board level. If cyber risks to physical infrastructure can impact operations, revenue, or public trust, they need the same attention as supply chain, finance, or legal. Strong basics build a stable environment. Start there and scale intentionally.
Growing public safety concerns due to cyber threats
Security is no longer just IT’s responsibility, it’s a public safety issue. When someone tampers with water treatment facilities, grain storage, or power distribution systems, the consequences extend far beyond digital boundaries. People get affected. Economies get disrupted. Trust erodes.
In the last wave of Canadian ICS attacks, public systems were the focus. Not enterprise networks. Not payment databases. It was infrastructure, things that sustain cities and regions. This shift signals a new front in cybersecurity risk. It’s about protecting the systems that support everyday life.
The motivation is changing, too. Hacktivists are going after targets that create headlines, leverage fear, and push social or political messages. As geopolitical tensions rise and activist tactics evolve, exposed infrastructure becomes an attractive platform for these attacks. Visibility is the target, and widespread disruption is a tool.
Executives should see this clearly. If your organization operates in water, power, transportation, energy, or agriculture, they’re not just industry sectors. They’re safety-critical layers of national stability. Your cybersecurity posture, therefore, isn’t just an internal risk profile, it plays a role in a broader, more visible ecosystem.
Get ahead of this. The systems your company depends on need clear isolation. Your teams need real-time threat visibility. And your leadership should treat infrastructure cybersecurity as a core part of corporate strategy. The next disruption won’t just be about downtime, it’ll be about public consequences. Be ready before that happens.
Key takeaways for decision-makers
- ICS exposure is a systemic vulnerability: Industrial control systems across Canadian infrastructure are exposed online with weak credentials and little segmentation. Leaders must drive investment in secure architecture and eliminate unnecessary internet-facing components.
- Cyberattacks are already disrupting physical operations: Real-world incidents, water pressure manipulation, false alarms in oil and gas, and compromised grain storage, highlight how minimal tampering can cause service outages. Executives should assess how digital breaches could trigger physical disruptions in their own environments.
- Poor network design is enabling rapid intrusions: Unsegmented networks and default access controls allow attackers to move quickly and alter essential operations. Organizations must prioritize network separation between IT and OT as a critical risk-mitigation strategy.
- Hacktivists are escalating visibility-driven disruptions: These aren’t stealth operations; they aim for immediate impact and public attention. Leaders should align their incident response strategies for high-visibility events with reputational risk controls.
- Cyber hygiene remains the most effective defense: Asset inventory, zero-trust enforcement, hardened remote access, and dynamic detection are essential baselines. Executive teams must ensure these fundamentals are executed consistently across all business units handling infrastructure.
- Public safety now depends on infrastructure security: With attackers targeting water, energy, and agriculture systems, weak cybersecurity is becoming a public risk issue. Boards and C-suite leaders must elevate infrastructure protection as a strategic and societal responsibility.
